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Abstract
We investigate the eﬀects of interregional labor market integration in a two-
sector, overlapping-generations model with land-intensive production in the non-
tradable goods sector (housing). To capture the response to migration on housing
supply, capital formation is endogenous, assuming that firms face capital adjust-
ment costs. Our analysis highlights heterogeneous welfare eﬀects of labor market
integration. Whereas individuals without residential property lose from immi-
gration due to increased housing costs, landowners may win. Moreover, we show
how the relationship between migration and capital formation depends on initial
conditions at the time of labor market integration. Our model is also capable to
explain the reversal of migration during the transition to the steady state, like
observed in East Germany after unification in 1990. It is also consistent with a
gradually rising migration stock and house prices in high-productivity countries
like Switzerland.
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1 Introduction
Immigration leads to both higher prices for non-tradable goods like housing and higher
rental rates of land. Increased housing costs may reduce welfare of natives and trigger
supply responses like residential investment. This paper investigates the eﬀects of inter-
regional labor market integration in a neoclassical two-sector, overlapping-generations
model with land-intensive production in the non-tradable goods sector. To capture the
response to migration on housing supply, capital formation is endogenous, assuming
that firms face capital stock adjustment costs.
The goal of the paper is twofold. First, we investigate welfare eﬀects of changes in
the population density in response to labor market integration by emphasizing changes
in the price of housing and the price of land. Welfare eﬀects of interregional labor
market integration are heterogeneous and depend on the ownership distribution of
land. Whereas individuals without residential property lose from immigration due to
increased housing costs, landowners may win. In other words, the eﬀects of an un-
equal distribution of land property are aggravated by immigration. Such distributional
concerns have typically been neglected in the previous literature on labor market inte-
gration. They potentially help to understand and address reservations to immigration
of certain groups in the host economy’s population.
Second, we examine whether, and under which circumstances, the relationship be-
tween interregional flows of migration and regional changes in the stock of physical
capital is positive or negative. Historically, there are examples for both possibili-
ties. For instance, the first era of globalization in the 19th century was characterized
by simultaneous capital and labor flows from Europe to the US (e.g., O’Rourke and
Williamson, 1999; Solimano and Watts, 2005). Moreover, at least in an early phase
of the enlargement process of the European Union (EU), labor was migrating from
Southern and Eastern EU members to Western EU countries like Germany or the UK.
However, temporarily, capital was flowing in the other direction or was accumulated
faster in some emigration countries. Our analysis shows how initial conditions and the
time passed after labor market integrated determines whether we observe that emi-
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gration goes along with accumulation or decumulation of capital. If the initial capital
stock is close to the pre-integration steady state level, we observe emigration (immi-
gration) and capital decumulation (accumulation) at the same time, consistent with
factor flows in the first era of globalization, for instance. The exact pattern also de-
pends on productivity diﬀerences and the initial population density. However, if the
capital stock is initially low, an emigration outflow may occur at the same time as the
capital stock accumulates. For instance, this is consistent with an investment boom
observed in East Germany and labor migration at a large scale from East to West
shortly after the German reunification in 1990 (e.g., Burda, 1996).
In the case where the initial level of capital is low, our analysis also suggests that
house prices fall, associated with declining population density shortly after labor mar-
ket integration. Consequently, the migration pattern is reversed in later phases. Thus,
our model also provides a candidate explanation for the phenomenon of "reverse mi-
gration", i.e., aggregate (net) outward migration followed by aggregate (net) inward
migration later on. For instance, reverse migration is observed in some regions in East
Germany after 1990 (e.g., Schäfer and Steger, 2012) and in Poland after becoming an
EU member in 2004.1 Typically, scholars employ models with increasing returns to
scale to explain non-monotonic time paths of a region’s population size (e.g., Schäfer
and Steger, 2012), whereas standard neoclassical models do not explain reverse migra-
tion (e.g., Braun, 1993; Burda 2006). Our model is capable to generate non-monotonic
transitions despite resting on constant returns to scale.
The key novelty of the paper is to simultaneously examine the implications of
migration on the dynamics of housing costs and land prices as well as their consequences
on capital formation and welfare. In addition to analyzing welfare eﬀects and explaining
1Poland experienced significant migration outflows most of the time in the post-WWII period
which continued in the process of the EU enlargement. However, recently, the trend has been reversed.
According to United Nations (2010), there has been a positive net migration inflow of about 56,000
between 2007 and 2011. Another example of reverse migration is Ireland. According to United Nations
(2010), Ireland experienced a net migration outflow of about 177,000 between 1980 and 1995, with a
subsequent net migration inflow until 2010 of 383,000. However, we do not associate an integration
shock with non-monotonic adjustment over time with this phenomenon. It may rather be due to
productivity advances and inward FDI in response to changes in the tax law. Thus, we will not
discuss the Irish case further.
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stylized facts, this enables us to suggest novel implications for structural estimations of
the determinants and eﬀects of migration. Whereas a large literature on the dynamic
eﬀects of migration has emphasized the impact on the level and distribution of wages,
we deliberately abstain from modeling productivity or wage eﬀects of migration in
most parts of our analysis.2 Rather, we shift the focus to the (relative) price for land-
intensive, non-tradable goods and the rental rate of land. For instance, Saiz (2003,
2007) and Nygaard (2011) find substantial eﬀects of immigration on rental rates and
house prices in the US and UK, respectively. Our theory is consistent with such price
eﬀects of migration.
There is a sizable literature on the relationship between capital formation and
interregional labor mobility.3 One emphasis is on increasing returns, which are absent
from our model.4 Closer to our paper, Rappaport (2005) and Burda (2006) study
neoclassical one-sector models with capital adjustment costs, exogenous interest rates
and interregional labor mobility. However, their focus is on wage convergence rather
than on the eﬀects of migration on housing costs and land prices as in our two-sector
model. Rappaport (2005) argues that higher labor mobility, which triggers increased
outflows of workers, does not necessarily increase the speed of income convergence.
For a given capital stock, emigration leads to increased wages in the source country.
However, emigration also drives down the shadow value of capital and therefore slows
2This is motivated by the mixed empirical evidence on wage eﬀects of migration, indicating small
eﬀects. For instance, Friedberg (2001) and Dustmann, Fabbri, and Preston (2005) show that immigra-
tion to Israel and the UK, respectively, only slightly reduces wages of low-skilled workers. It may even
moderately raise wages of high-skilled workers. For the US, Borjas (2003) reports significant negative
wage eﬀects of immigration for low-skilled workers. By contrast, Ottaviano and Peri (2012), by taking
into account the substitutability between migrants and natives of similar education and experience
levels, do not find any negative eﬀect. Grossmann and Stadelmann (2012) employ international data
and find a negligible impact of bilateral skilled migration on bilateral (log) diﬀerences of GDP per
capita, total factor productivity, and wages of skilled workers.
3For an extensive literature survey, see Felbermayr, Grossmann and Kohler (2012).
4Faini (1995) contrasts models of exogenous and endogenous growth, arguing that income conver-
gence is not necessarily less likely in the case of learning-by-doing eﬀects. Reichlin and Rustichini
(1998) employ an endogenous growth model with learning-by-doing eﬀects to show that immigration
enhances interregional wage diﬀerences due to a scale eﬀect, benefitting the receiving destination. On
the other hand, migration may change the skill composition of the workforce in a way which may
also benefit the source economy. Schäfer and Steger (2012) emphasize how equilibrium selection and
dynamics depend on both expectations and initial conditions in a multi-region model where increasing
returns give rise to multiple equilibria.
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down capital investment. The latter eﬀect results in delayed income convergence.
Burda (2006) studies the dynamics of labor migration and capital accumulation under
factor adjustment costs. In his model, per capita income of the East German economy
converges to the West German level as labor moves towards West Germany and capital
accumulates in the East.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the basic model in which
individuals earn labor income only. Section 3 derives the dynamic system for the basic
model, solves for the steady state, provides analytical results, and discusses implications
for empirical estimations of the determinants and eﬀects of migration. In section 4,
we numerically simulate the transition path to the steady state in response to labor
market integration conditional on productivity diﬀerences and . Section 5 extends
the basic model to examine distributional eﬀects of labor market integration when
individuals diﬀer in their ownership of land. Section 6 discusses how our model can
replicate the recent experience of Switzerland after its major integration shocks in the
last decade and may help to understand the ongoing public debate on immigration.
The last section concludes.
2 The Basic Model
Consider a simple overlapping generations model with two-period lives of a perfectly
competitive, small open ("domestic") economy. There are two sectors, a tradeable
goods sector and a non-tradable goods sector. Labor can be employed in both sectors
and reallocated without any frictions. There is international capital mobility at an
(exogenous) interest rate   0. Moreover, there is a large ("foreign") economy from or
to which migration may take place. We distinguish the cases of interregionally immobile
and mobile labor and thereby investigate the eﬀects of labor market integration. Time
is discrete and indexed by  = 0 1 2 
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2.1 Firms
In the non-tradable goods sector, denoted by superscript , there is a mass one of firms.
For instance, this sector could be interpreted as housing sector. It produces with labor,
physical capital and a fixed factor which we refer to as land in the following. Output
  in period  is given by
  = 
¡ ¢ () 1−− (1)
  0,   ∈ (0 1), +  1, where  is the amount of physical (residential) capital,
 the amount of labor employed in the non-tradable goods sector, and  is land input
(which equals land supply).5 The capital stock evolves according to
+1 =  + (1− ) (2)
where  is gross (housing) investment in terms of the tradable good,   0 is the
depreciation rate and 0  0 is given. There are (convex) capital-adjustment costs
in the non-tradable goods sector (see Abel, 1982; Hayashi, 1982). The typical firm,
taking goods and factor prices as given, solves the following dynamic problem:
max
{ }∞=0
∞X
=0
   −  −   − 
h
1 + 
³

´i
(1 + ) s.t. (1), (2), (3)
   0, where  denotes the price of the non-tradable good,  is the wage rate, and
 is the price of land, respectively.
There is also a mass one of firms in the tradable goods sector, denoted by superscript
 , which we choose as numeraire (i.e., output price  ≡ 1). For simplicity, firms
5The time index  is sometimes omitted, provided that this may not lead to confusion.
5
produce with labor as the only input.6 Output   is given by
  =   (4)
  0, where  denotes the amount of labor employed in the tradable goods sector.
Since the labor market is perfect, the wage rate equals the (constant) labor productivity
in the tradable goods sector,  = . Moreover, as labor is homogenous, also the
distribution of wages within the economy is unaﬀected by migration.
For simplicity, we assume that firms in the non-tradable goods sector are owned
by foreigners. In the basic model, the same applies to the fixed factor, land. In an
extension of the model in section 5, we examine the consequences of migration for
welfare of natives when land is owned by natives.
2.2 Households
Each individual lives for two periods ("working-age" and "retirement") and has one
child when old, i.e., the size of the native population remains constant over time.
Let 1 and 1 denote the amount of tradable and non-tradeable goods consumed
by a working-age individual born in , respectively. Analogously, 2+1 and 2+1 are
consumption levels during retirement. Life-time utility of an individual born in period
 is given by
 = (1 1) +  · (2+1 2+1) (5)
where  ∈ (0 1). The instantaneous utility function reads (  ) =  log ¡ ¢+(1−
) log ¡¢ with  ∈ (0 1). In the first period, each individual supplies one unit of
labor when young to the sector with the highest wage and chooses how much to save
(or borrow). Moreover, individuals decide at the beginning of the first period whether
to stay or to migrate to the large economy, seeking to maximize utility.
For simplicity, in the case of integrated labor markets, we abstain from imposing
6In section 6, we modify the production technology such that output of the tradable good is
produced with both labor and capital unter constant returns. First, however, in the basic model, we
want to shut down any channel through wage eﬀects.
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limits to labor flows exogenously via assuming psychological migration costs, institu-
tional migration barriers, monetary moving costs or labor adjustment costs of firms. We
rather want to focus on endogenously changing house prices in response to migration
to limit migration flows despite persistent wage diﬀerentials. Thereby, migration flows
are endogenously smoothed along with adjustments in the capital stock. In any period,
equilibrium utility of (similarly endowed) individuals is equalized across regions.
Recalling that  = 1, each individual solves
max
112+12+1
 s.t. 1 +  1 +
2+1 + +12+1
1 +  ≤ (6)
where  is the present discounted value of income from the perspective of a young
individual. Since in the basic model individuals receive labor income only, we have
 =  = .
The number of workers (i.e., the number of young individuals) in period  is denoted
by . Thus, total population size in period  is given by  := +−1. The number
of initially old natives, −1  0, is given. In the case where labor is not interregionally
mobile,  = −1 and  = 2−1 for all  ≥ 0, since each period the same number
of individuals is born. Denote the population density by  :=  , where −1  0 is
given.
2.3 Foreign Economy
The foreign economy is assumed to be in steady state and is large in the sense that
migration from or towards the domestic economy has no eﬀect on the population density
in the (large) foreign economy, denoted by∗. It is therefore time-invariant. Similarly,
domestic saving decisions do not change the international interest rate, . Productivity
levels in the tradable and non-tradable goods sector of the foreign economy, ∗ and ∗,
may diﬀer from the domestic levels,  and . In all other respects than productivity
levels and the population density, the domestic and the foreign economy are identical
initially.
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3 Equilibrium Analysis
For simplicity, we assume that the following standard relationship between the interest
rate and the discount rate holds:
(1 + ) = 1 (7)
Lemma 1. The goods demand structure of an individual born in  is given by
1 = 2+1 = 1 +  (8)
1 = 1− 1 + 

  

2+1 =
1− 
1 + 

+1 . (9)
Individual welfare reads
 = (1 + ) log
µ(1− )1−
1 +  
¶
− (1− ) £log  +  log +1¤ ≡  (   +1)
(10)
All proofs are relegated to the appendix. Lemma 1 shows that life-time utility 
is decreasing in the price of non-tradables () in both periods of life. Thus, if wages
are the only source of income (not being aﬀected by immigration) and if immigration
raises house prices, then immigration has an unambiguously negative eﬀect on welfare.
Obviously, this could change if immigration had positive wage eﬀects, a channel from
which we deliberately abstract in the basic model (see, however, section 6, where we
allow for wage eﬀects by assuming that capital is an input also in the tradable goods
sector).
Denote by  ∗ the (steady state) life-time utility of an individual who lives in the
foreign economy. Moreover, denote by  the shadow price of capital, i.e., the multiplier
to capital accumulation constraint (2) in the profit maximization problem (3) of the
non-tradable goods sector.
An equilibrium is defined as follows.
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Definition 1. An equilibrium consists of time paths for quantities {    
+1           }∞=0 and prices {     }∞=0 such that the capital stock
evolves according to (2) and it holds in any period that
1. firms maximize the present discounted value of cash flow;
2. households maximize life-time utility;
3. if and only if labor is interregionally mobile, life-time utility of domestic residents
equals life-time utility in the foreign economy,  (   +1) =  ∗;
4. the wage rate is equal across sectors;
5. the labor market clears,  +  = ;
6. the market for non-tradables clears,   = 1 + 2−1.
Conditions 1, 2 and 5 are straightforward. Equilibrium condition 3 holds since
individuals can costlessly migrate if labor is interregionally mobile.7 Condition 4 holds
since individuals are perfectly mobile across sectors and seek the sector with the highest
wage. Thus, in equilibrium, the wage rate in the tradable goods sector coincides with
that in the non-tradable goods sector. To understand condition 6, recall that the non-
tradable good cannot be used for investment purposes. Also note that, in period ,
1 is the total goods demand for non-tradables of young agents and 2−1 is the
total goods demand for non-tradables of old agents.
3.1 Exogenous Increase in Population Density
We now solve for the equilibrium. We start with the simple case where the population
density,  :=  , is exogenous before we turn to endogenous migration. Define  :=

 and  :=  , as the (residential) capital stock per unit of land ("capital density")
7Also recall that life-time income equals the wage rate in the basic model,  = . Taking into
account fixed migration costs in terms of utility loss, , would not change the conclusions of our paper.
In this case, the no-arbitrage condition would read  (   +1)−  ∗ = .
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and gross investment per unit of land ("investment density"), respectively. Note that
0 = 0  0.
Proposition 1. Suppose that the sequence of population density { }∞=0 is given.
(i) The capital density ( ), the investment density ( ), and the shadow value
of capital ( ) jointly evolve over time according to a saddle-point stable system which
is given by
+1 =  + (1− )  (11)

 =
µ  − 1
( + 1) 
¶ 1  (12)
+1 = 1 + 
1−   −
1
1− 
"
+1
µ (1− )
1 + 
¶ ¡+1¢ ¡+1¢−1 − µ+1+1
¶+1#

(13)
The price of non-tradables (  ) and the price of land (  ) are given by
 = 
−
µ
1− 
1 + 
¶1− ¡ ¢− ¡ ¢1−  (14)
 =  ≡ ˜(  ) (15)
respectively, where  ≡ (1−−)(1−)
1+ .
(ii) If  is time-invariant, then, in the long run, the capital density and the price
of the non-tradable good are given by
 =  ≡ ˜( ) (16)
 =  
1−

¡¢1−− ≡ ˜(  ) (17)
respectively, where  ≡ (1−)
(1+)[(1+(1+))+++1] and  ≡
³
1−
1+
´1− −−.
According to Proposition 1, for a given population density, , adjustment of
the capital density,  , to the steady state is gradual. Moreover, both for a given
capital stock and in the long run, the price of the non-tradable good,  , rises with
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, according to (14) and (17), respectively. This is because immigration leads to
a dilution eﬀect with respect to the fixed factor (land) when producing non-tradable
goods. The eﬀect of an exogenous increase in population density on  is mitigated if
there is a supply response in the form of capital formation (increase in ), according
to (14).
According to (15), in any period, the price of land,  , is independent of the capital
density,  , and proportional to the population density, . An increase in  has
two counteracting eﬀects on , which cancel out. First, an increase in  raises the
value of the marginal product of land for a given price of non-tradables,  . Secondly,
however, as we have just argued,  falls with , which lowers the value of the
marginal product of land. An increase in  raises the value of the marginal product
of land for a given price of non-tradables,  , and through an increase in  (as argued
above), thereby raising the price of land.
Finally, the long run capital stock per unit of land, ˜, is proportional to the
population density, . An increase in  triggers higher employment in both sectors.
It therefore stimulates capital investments.
We are now ready to derive comparative-static results for the case where the pop-
ulation density is exogenous.
Proposition 2. Suppose that the population density, , is exogenous.
(i) An increase in , and/or an increase in total factor productivity (TFP) in the
tradable goods sector () leads to both a gradual increase in the capital density, ,
and an upward jump of the land price, , which is constant thereafter. The price of
non-tradables,  , jumps upwards and then gradually declines to a level which exceeds
the pre-shock level.
(ii) An increase in the TFP-level of the non-tradable goods sector, , has neither an
impact on capital formation nor on the price of land, but leads to a downward jump of
 .
Fig. 1 illustrates the impact of an increase in population density (exogenous im-
migration) on the dynamic two-equation system (11) and (13), starting from an initial
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steady state. As is easy to see, the locus implied by (11) in − −space which refers
to a time-invariant capital density (∆ = 0) is unaﬀected. By contrast, the locus
implied by (13), which refers to a time-invariant shadow price of capital (∆ = 0),
shifts to the right. Consequently, for a given initial steady state capital density (˜0 ),
the shadow price of capital jumps upwards, triggering gradual adjustment on the sad-
dle path to the new steady state (with capital density ˜1  ˜0 ). The reason is that
an increase in  immediately raises the (relative) price of non-tradables. This gives
rise to capital formation which in turn mitigates the initial jump in  . The land price
increases due to a higher value of the marginal product of land.
Figure 1: Phase diagram in −−space and the impact of an increase in population
density,  .
Qualitatively, the impact of an increase in productivity of the tradable goods sector
 (increase in the wage rate) is similar. By contrast, an increase in the TFP-level of the
non-tradable sector (), by raising supply of non-tradable goods for given inputs, has
a negative eﬀect on  . However, for given  , it also raises the marginal productivity
of inputs. With respect to capital formation and the price of land, both eﬀects cancel
out.
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3.2 The Eﬀects of Labor Market Integration
We now turn to the case where labor is interregionally mobile (endogenous migration).
Proposition 3. Suppose that labor is interregionally mobile.
(i) The sequence {     }∞=0 is jointly determined by (11)-(14) and
(1 + ) log
³ 
∗
´
= (1− )
∙
log
µ 
∗
¶
+  log
µ+1
∗
¶¸
 (18)
where ∗ = ˜(∗ ∗ ∗).
(ii) In steady state, the population density ˜ is given by
˜ =
"³ 
∗
´ 1−(1−)(1−)
1−
µ 
∗
¶# 11−−
∗ (19)
With respect to the steady state, the following comparative-static results hold.
Corollary 1. Suppose that labor is interregionally mobile.
(i) ˜ is increasing in the relative productivity level across regions of both sectors,

∗ and

∗ .
(ii) ˜ is proportional to the foreign population density, ∗.
An increase in relative productivity across regions of the tradable goods sector, ∗ ,
has two counteracting eﬀects on the steady state labor force of the domestic economy
when labor is interregionally mobile. First, since ∗ is the relative wage rate (and thus
relative income) of individuals across regions, the domestic economy becomes more
attractive for potential migrants. Second, as implied by part (i) of Proposition 2, for a
given population density, it also raises the price of non-tradables in the domestic region
relative to the one in the foreign region; in turn, this lowers the attractiveness of the
domestic economy for migrants. The first eﬀect dominates the second one.
An increase in the relative productivity of the non-tradable goods sector, ∗ , has
no income eﬀect. However, for given labor inputs, it lowers the relative price of non-
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tradables across regions, which makes the domestic economy more attractive for immi-
grants.
Finally, an increase in the foreign population density, ∗, raises the price of non-
tradables in the foreign economy, ∗, and therefore enhances attractiveness of the
domestic economy for migrants.
We next examine the dynamic eﬀects of labor market integration on the key vari-
ables. We emphasize the role of initial conditions for factor flows, the price of non-
tradables, and the rental rate of land.
Proposition 4. Suppose that, initially, the labor market is closed interregionally.
Opening up the labor market leads to the following eﬀects:
(i) If the economy is initially in steady state (i.e., 0 = ˜(−1 )) and −1 
()˜, the long run levels of the capital density (), the price for non-tradables
( ) and the price of land ( ) are higher (lower) than their initial levels.
(ii) If the initial capital density is below its post-integration steady state value (i.e.,
0  ˜(˜ )), then emigration may go along with capital formation during the
transition to the steady state equilibrium.
(iii) The price for non-tradables ( ) instantaneously jumps to its new steady state
level.
Suppose first that the population density under a closed labor market is initially
lower than its steady state value after labor market integration (−1  ˜). According
to part (i) of Proposition 4, this means that the long run capital density will be higher
than its initial level in response to labor market integration. Formally, ˜(−1 ) 
˜(˜ ). The same is true for the prices of non-tradables () and land (). The
reason is that the long run values of these variables are increasing in population density
(Proposition 1). The opposite holds if −1  ˜.
Next, suppose 0  ˜(˜ ), as presumed in part (ii) of Proposition 4. If, in
addition, the initial population density is not below the post-integration steady state
value (i.e., −1 ≥ ˜), in the long run, we end up with an increased capital density.
To prove the result that there may be emigration and capital formation in the same
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period, we need to examine transitional dynamics. As we will see in the numerical
analysis of section 4, a low initial capital density triggers outward migration as an
immediate response to labor market integration while at the same time the standard
neoclassical convergence mechanism induces capital formation. As emigration reduces
the shadow price of capital, labor market integration retards investments, however. In
the aftermath, as capital further accumulates, there will be reverse migration.
Finally, as also illustrated in section 4, the intuition for part (iii) of Proposition 4
lies in two counteracting and oﬀ-setting eﬀects of labor market integration on the price
of non-tradables,  . An integration shock leads to an instantaneous jump in  . One
period after the integration shock, the labor force and the capital stock evolve in the
same direction during the remaining transition. Whereas a rising population density
() raises  , an increasing capital density () lowers  . That both eﬀects exactly
cancel is an implication of the fact that the wage rate is time-invariant in the basic
model. In section 6, we modify the production technology in the tradable goods sector
to relax this property. Note that the eﬀect on  in the case of endogenous migration
is diﬀerent than in the case of exogenous migration, where a labor inflow first led to
a jump in  with gradual decreases due to capital formation thereafter (part (i) of
Proposition 2). As will be seen in section 6, this prediction does not apply to the Swiss
case, suggesting that an analysis with endogenous migration could be more useful to
understand stylized facts.
3.3 Implications for Structural Estimations
Our analysis has emphasized the interaction between migration flows (determining
population density) and house prices, taking into account capital formation in the
housing sector. The two-way interaction suggests that any empirical analysis of this
relationship may run into severe endogeneity problems. We now discuss how our theory
could help to address these problems. We start with the determinants of migration
flows. The empirical literature on the determinants of migration has emphasized the
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role of wage diﬀerences across regions (e.g., Grogger and Hanson, 2011).8 In our
basic model, these are rooted in productivity diﬀerences in the tradable goods sector.
According to our theory, diﬀerences in house prices determine migration flows as well,
but the causality also runs in the opposite direction. According to the expression
for the steady state price of non-tradable goods, ˜ , in (17), diﬀerences in sectoral
productivity across regions as well as diﬀerences in population density aﬀect long-run
diﬀerences in house prices. The exogenous determinants of both wage rates and house
prices are reflected in (19) which gives us the long run population density in a region
and can be rewritten as
log
Ã
˜
−1
!
= 1 log
³ 
∗
´
+ 2 log
µ 
∗
¶
+ 3 log
µ∗
−1
¶
 (20)
where 1 ≡ 1−(1−)(1−)(1−)(1−−) , 2 ≡ 11−− , 3 = 1. Thus, Proposition 3 predicts that the
migration-induced long run growth rate in population density (or the growth rate of
the stock of immigrants) of a region depends on the initial diﬀerence of (the log of)
population density to other regions and on sectoral total factor productivity levels rel-
ative to other regions. We are not aware of any empirical study on the determinants
of migration which takes into account house price diﬀerences across regions through
diﬀerences in population size. Moreover, Proposition 4 suggests that, during the tran-
sition, migration patterns which evolve from labor market integration critically depend
on the initial capital density as well.
We now turn to the eﬀects of migration. Our theory suggests a structural equation
system which, for instance, could be estimated by two-stage least squares. Measures of
change of immigration policy provide exogenous variation to instrument migration flows
at the first stage whereas the determinants of migration we just discussed should be used
as additional controls. At the second stage, for instance, capital flows could be regressed
8Other important determinants of bilateral migration flows are similiar as in gravity-type estima-
tions of trade flows, like distance between countries, whether source and destination share a common
language, institutional mobility barriers, and other factors which aﬀect mobility costs (for an overview
on this literature, see Felbermayr et al., 2012). Beine, Docquier and Ozden (2011) also stress network
eﬀects from past migration as an important trigger of further immigration.
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on the instrumented migration flows. Our model implies that the causal relationship of
immigration (emigration) flows to capital inflows (outflows) is unambiguously positive,
although capital formation and emigration could occur at the same time, according to
part (ii) of Proposition 4. This is because emigration slows down capital formation
which takes place due to convergence forces, when the capital density is low initially.
Similarly, the causal eﬀect of immigration (emigration) on the price of land, , and
the price of housing,  , is positive (negative).
4 Numerical Analysis
We now turn to numerical analysis in order to illustrate the role of initial conditions for
the relationship between capital formation and migration in response to labor market
integration, already indicated in the discussion of Proposition 4. Moreover, we inves-
tigate the evolution of the price for non-tradables, the price of land, the shadow price
of capital, and gross investment over time.
4.1 Calibration
We employ the following baseline calibration. Assuming an annual real interest rate
of 2 percent and a length of a generation of about 35 years suggests that  = 1; thus
 = 05, according to (7). Empirical evidence points to a budget share on housing
of about one third (e.g., Johnson, Rogers and Tan, 2001), which suggests  = 2
3
.
Moreover, we set  = 05, which reflects an annual depreciation rate of about 2 percent
in a period of 35 years. We also employ the standard quadratic specification of capital
stock adjustment costs, which means that we set  = 1. In addition, we assume  = 05
which implies that, in a steady state with  =  = 05, one unit of gross investment
requires 1 +  ¡  ¢ = 125 units of the tradable good. For output elasticities in the
non-tradable goods sector, we set  = 05 and  = 03. Finally, we normalize the
foreign (exogenous) population density to ∗ = 1.9
9We do not have to calibrate the land size, . All endogenous variables can be expressed relative
to . This can be seen from the dynamic system in Proposition 1 and 3.
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4.2 Labor Market Integration
We now visualize the eﬀects of labor market integration on the evolution of the popu-
lation density,  =  , the capital density,  =  , the investment density,  =  ,
the shadow price of capital, , the price of land,  , and the price of non-tradables,  .
Figure 2 (a): The impact of labor market integration in period  = 0 on a high-productivity
economy which initially has the same population density as abroad and is in steady state.
Note:  =  = 55, ∗ = ∗ = 5, 0 = ˜(−1 ), and −1= ∗= 1  ˜.
In Fig. 2 (a), the economy is initially in its pre-labor-market-integration steady
state, which corresponds to the case in part (i) of Proposition 4. Moreover, we assume
that, initially, the population density coincides with that of the foreign economy, −1 =
∗ = 1. Productivity levels are, however, 10 percent higher compared to the foreign
economy, i.e. ∗ =

∗ = 11. That is, the initial population density is below its
post-integration long run level, −1  ˜, and the initial capital density reads 0 =
˜(−1 ). This constellation may be interpreted as the case of an advanced country
which opens up the labor market. As we will argue in section 6, an appropriate example
which can be discussed in the light of our model is the case of Switzerland which opened
the labor market to the EU in the 2000s.
Now, when the labor market is opened up in period  = 0, the population density,
, jumps upwards and then gradually increases along with the capital density. The
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migration inflow, induced by a comparably high domestic wage rate, raises the demand
for non-tradables and triggers an increase in the price of non-tradables,  , as well as
an increase in the price of land,  . The upward jump in  represents a drag on further
migration inflows. In line with part (iii) of Proposition 4,  instantaneously jumps to
its new steady state level, as displayed in the last panel of Fig. 2 (a). Also the shadow
value of installed capital, , goes up, fostering higher investment. Consequently, the
capital stock rises.
Figure 2 (b): The impact of labor market integration in period  = 0 on a high-productivity
economy which initially has the same population density as abroad and is in steady state.
Note:  =  = 5, ∗ = ∗ = 55, 0 = ˜(−1 ), and −1= ∗= 1  ˜.
In Fig. 2 (b), as before, the economy is initially in its pre-labor-market-integration
steady state and −1 = ∗ = 1. Productivity levels are now about 10 percent lower
compared to the foreign economy, i.e. ∗ =

∗ ∼= 09. That is, the initial population
density is below its post-integration long run level, −1  ˜, and the initial capital
density reads 0 = ˜(−1 ). When the labor market is opened up in period
 = 0, the population density, , jumps downwards and then gradually declines
along with the capital density. The migration outflow, induced by a comparably low
domestic wage rate, reduces the demand for non-tradables and triggers a decrease
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in the price of non-tradables,  , as well as a decrease in the price of land, . The
downward jump in  represents a drag on further migration outflows. Also the shadow
value of installed capital, , goes down, fostering lower gross investment such that
net investment turns negative. Consequently, the capital stock declines. In sum, if
the initial capital stock is at the pre-labor-market-integration steady state level, we
observe emigration (immigration), lower (higher) house and land prices, and capital
decumulation (accumulation) at the same time.
Figure 3: Solid lines show dynamic responses assuming labor market integration at  = 0
for an initially capital-poor economy with the same population density as abroad. Dotted
lines show dynamic responses assuming that labor markets remain closed. Note:
 = ∗=  = ∗= 5, 0  ˜(˜ ), −1= ˜ .
We now assume that domestic productivity levels are equal to the foreign economy,
i.e.,  = ∗ and  = ∗. Eq. (19) then implies that the post-integration long run popu-
lation density coincides with that of the foreign economy, ˜ = ∗ = 1. The initial
population density is also equal to this value (−1 = ∗), while the capital density
is lower than the post-integration value, 0  ˜(˜ ). The solid time paths of
Fig. 3 illustrate economic development provided that the labor market is opened up at
 = 0. The dotted lines show, in contrast, economic development under the alternative
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assumption of closed labor markets. Fig. 3 (solid lines) illustrates part (ii) of Proposi-
tion 4, i.e., the possibility that emigration may go along with capital accumulation after
labor markets integrate. We see that the population density considerably falls below
∗ = ˜ immediately after the integration shock. Therefore, also the shadow value
of capital drops, leading to a lower investment density,  . Nevertheless, as  is still
above its steady state level, which reflects the standard neoclassical convergence force,
there is still capital accumulation. Over time, and after the immediate response of 
to integration, population density rises along with capital accumulation. This explains
why the land price,  , rises after its initial drop. The price of the non-tradable good,
 , again jumps immediately to the new steady state level. As argued in the discussion
of part (iii) of Proposition 4, the eﬀect of the gradually increasing  and  on 
cancel out such that  remains unchanged below its pre-integration level during the
transition. This case provides a candidate explanation for reverse migration, which
coincides, for instance, with the recent experience in Poland and East Germany. Turn-
ing to the alternative scenario of closed labor markets (dotted lines), we see that 
remains constant,  is much higher, compared to the case of labor market integration
and resulting emigration, such that capital gets accumulated more quickly. The land
price,  , does not drop and the price for non-tradables,  , declines gradually, which
reflects the absence of emigration.10
It is worth noting that reverse migration cannot be explained by standard neoclas-
sical models (Rappaport, 1995; Burda, 2006). Technically, the diﬀerence between our
model and standard neoclassical models of migration and capital mobility based on
some form of convex adjustment costs for both capital and labor is that, in our model,
labor is a jump variable determined by the no-arbitrage condition  (   +1) =  ∗
(see Definition 1) and not a sluggish state variable (e.g., Braun, 1993; Rapapport, 2005).
10Notice that this does not contradict Proposition 4 (iii), which assumes that the labor market is
opened up such that (18) holds. This is not the case for the scenario represented by the dotted lines
in Fig. 3.
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5 Distribution of Land and Welfare
For simplicity, we have so far assumed that land is not owned by individuals in the
domestic economy. Moreover, the previous analysis suggests that the price of the non-
tradable good is higher than its initial level at all times after a shock which induces labor
inflows. Thus, if individuals earn labor income only, the native population necessarily
loses from immigration, according to (10).
In this section, by contrast, we assume that initially land is fully owned by the −1
old natives. Landowners bequeath their landholding to their child when leaving the
scene, such that the number of landowners and the land distribution among natives is
time-invariant. Let () denote the landholding of individual . For the sake of realism,
suppose that a non-negligible fraction of natives is landless (for such an individual ,
() = 0).
In period , a young individual  who stays in the domestic economy has a present
discounted value of life-time income, (), which is given by
() = + 
+1
1 + () (21)
(recall that the wage rate is  =  and land is owned by old individuals). Life-time
utility of individual  born in  is  (()   +1), where function  is given by (10).
5.1 Equilibrium Analysis
We again start with the case where population density is exogenous. The dynamic
system modifies as follows.
Proposition 5. Suppose that the sequence of population density { }∞=0 is given.
(i) The capital density ( ), the investment density ( ), the shadow value of
capital ( ), the price of the non-tradable good (  ), and the price of land (  ) jointly
evolve over time according to (11), (12) and
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(ii) If  is time-invariant, then, in the long run, the price of land, the capital
density, and the price of the non-tradable good are respectively given by11
 = ˜
( )
1− 2 ≡ ˆ
( ) (25)
 = ˜
( )
1− 2 ≡ ˆ
( ) (26)
 =
µ
1
1− 2
¶1−−
˜(  ) ≡ ˆ(  ) (27)
Comparing Proposition 5 with Proposition 1, the dynamics appear more compli-
cated than in the case where natives do not own land. The reason is that individuals
who own land have to anticipate the future price of land.
Comparison with Proposition 1 also reveals that, in the long run, the price of land
(), the capital density () and the price of non-tradables () are higher than in
the case where nobody owns land: ˆ  ˜, ˆ  ˜ , ˆ  ˜ . The key ingredient
of the model which gives rise to this result is the declining marginal productivity of
land: if natives receive land rents in addition to wage income, this raises the demand
for all goods. However, since land is a fixed factor, it becomes more scarce. This raises
the price of land along with house prices. As a consequence of the latter, incentives to
11Recall from part (i) of Proposition 1 the parameter definition  = (1−−)(1−)1+ . Note that
    ∈ (0 1) and +   1 implies 1  2.
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accumulate capital are higher as well.
Note that the distribution of land does not aﬀect the dynamic system. The reason
lies in the assumption of homothetic preferences, which implies that aggregate goods
demand is independent of the income distribution.
We now turn to the equilibrium analysis for the case of interregionally mobile labor.
Lemma 2. When landless individuals are indiﬀerent whether or not to migrate,
no landowner wants to migrate.
Lemma 2 suggests that the incentive to migrate is higher for landless individuals.
The reason is simple. Land rents are received from the home region irrespective of the
location decision, whereas wage income depends on the chosen location. Thus, income-
related migration benefits come from wage diﬀerentials only. Diﬀerences in the log of
income across regions are therefore higher for landless individuals. We focus on an
equilibrium where only (some) landless individuals migrate. For such an equilibrium
to exist, the share of landless individuals has to be suﬃciently large. In this case,
the no-arbitrage condition (18) for the migration decision (equilibrium condition 3
of Definition 1) still holds, where now the price of non-tradables abroad is given by
∗ = ˆ(∗ ∗ ∗). Consequently, the steady state population density is still given
by (19) such that Corollary 1 applies. Thus, the implications on structural estimations,
discussed in subsection 3.3, still apply.
Moreover, if we conduct the same experiments as for Fig. 2 and 3, the dynamics
triggered by an integration shock are qualitatively the same as in the case where no
individual owns land (available on request). That is, if labor markets are opened when
the economy is in steady state initially, population density (), capital density (),
and prices for both non-tradables () and land () move into the same direction
(Fig. 2). When the economy is not in steady state at the time labor markets integrate,
population density and capital density may move in diﬀerent directions instantaneously
in response to integration (Fig. 3).
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5.2 Welfare
We now analyze the eﬀects of labor market integration on individual welfare, condi-
tional on land endowment. For the long run, we find the following result.
Proposition 6. If labor market integration leads to an increase in the long run
population density, landowners of the steady state generations win if and only if they
own a suﬃcient amount of land; landless individuals lose.
Proposition 6 suggests an important distributional impact of immigration which
is diﬀerent from eﬀects on the distribution of labor income often discussed in the
literature. If housing demand increases in response to immigration, both land rents
of landowners and the price of housing increase.12 If and only if the land estate of
an individual is suﬃciently high, the positive eﬀect of immigration on land income
dominates. Thus, there is a threshold amount of landholding, ¯  0, such that all
individuals with ()  ()¯ win (lose) from labor market integration.
We now discuss welfare eﬀects of integration over time for non-steady state gener-
ations. To do so, we need to compare the time paths of house prices and land prices
with and without integrated labor markets. Recall that house prices immediately jump
to the new steady state level after labor market integration. In the scenario where the
pre-integration capital stock was initially at the steady state level and population den-
sity was low to begin with, the land price rises over time (Fig. 2). Thus, the threshold
land endowment ¯ above which an individual gains from immigration falls over time.
As consumers, individuals lose from integration in any period. But as the stock of
immigrants rises, later generations of landowners earn higher income than earlier ones.
When the economy is initially capital-poor, labor market integration leads to em-
igration and retarded capital accumulation (Fig. 3). Also recall that the land price
drops initially in response to integration but, in contrast to house prices, rises after-
wards as the migration flow reverses. Without migration, the land price would have
12As discussed after Proposition 1, there are also two counteracting supply eﬀects of immigration on
the price of land, which cancel each other. First, when more houses are built, land becomes scarcer.
This raises land prices for given house prices. Second, however, house prices decline. This has a
depressing eﬀect on the value of the marginal product of land.
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been constant over time whereas the house price would have fallen gradually without
integration due to capital accumulation. Thus, in the scenario of Fig. 3, where the
steady states with and without migration coincide, we can conclude that non-steady
state generations of landless individuals are better oﬀ with integration. Non-steady
state generations of rich landowners, however, may lose during the transition.
6 The Case of Switzerland
Without exaggeration, immigration is one of the most debated issues in the Swiss
public in the last 10 years and beyond. Switzerland is an interesting case because it
is a high-wage country which has experienced a substantial labor market integration
shock. In the year 2002, it signed a bilateral agreement with the European Union on
the free movement of labor. With respect to the EU15 plus Malta and Cyprus, referred
to as EU17 in the following, it came into full eﬀect in 2007.13 This exogenous event
in a small high-wage country serves as a kind of "natural experiment" to "test" the
predictions of our model as visualized in Fig. 2 (a). (Recall that, in Fig. 2 (a), we
study the impact of labor market integration on an economy with high productivity
and an initial capital density which coincides with the pre-labor-market-integration
steady state level).
Fig. 4 shows the annual net migration inflow into Switzerland from the year 2002
to 2010 by the region of origin. The integration process provoked net immigration from
the EU17 at first to slightly increase after 2002, jumping upwards after 2007. In the
"control group" of non-EU17 countries, net immigration shows only a slight upward
trend. Consistent with the first panel in Fig. 2 (a), which displays the population
density as a strictly concave function during the transition to the new steady state
after labor markets integrate, net migration inflows decreased after the initial jumps
13Between 2002-2006, immigration to Switzerland was only slightly facilitated. Like before,
residents were still preferred in the labor market, meaning that a potential employer had to
prove that the firm does not find an adequate resident for the job. Moreover, immigration
quotas were held in place. For most Eastern European countries free movement of labor has
come into eﬀect in May 2011. Burgaria and Romania even have to wait until mid 2016. See
http://www.bfm.admin.ch/content/bfm/en/home/themen/fza_schweiz-eu-efta.html
26
in 2007 and 2008.
Figure 4: Net immigration flow to Switzerland (annual number of immigrants minus
number of emigrants) between 2002-2010 from EU17 and non-EU17 countries. (Source:
bfs.admin.ch; own calculations)
Figure 5: Rental price index for Switzerland, monthly data, oﬀer-based. (Source: ZKB,
Zürcher Kantonal Bank; www.zkb.ch)
Moreover, rental prices for houses and apartments in Switzerland started to increase
in 2004 and rose by 20 percent between 2002 and 2010, as displayed by Fig. 5.14 This
14Similarly, sales prices for houses rose slightly between 2002-2006 and surged thereafter. There
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sluggish price increase is not readily compatible with the transitional dynamics for the
price of housing,  , derived from our basic model. Fig. 2 (a) suggests that  jumps
immediately to a higher steady state level in response to integration. However, the
absence of transitional dynamics in  hinges on the simplifying assumption that only
labor enters the production function of the tradable good (  =  ). Allowing for
capital as a second input in the tradable goods sector modifies the transition path of
 . Let  denote the stock of capital employed in the tradable goods sector. We
maintain a constant-returns to scale technology and modify the production function to
  = 
¡ ¢ ¡ ¢1− , (28)
 ∈ (0 1). Conducting the same experiment as in Fig. 2 (a), Fig. 6 shows that 
(left panel) increases smoothly during the transition to the new steady state. The price
of non-tradable goods,  , drops initially because the wage rate, , falls at  = 0 in
response to migration inflows, as displayed in the right panel. This reduces the demand
for the non-tradeable good, as can be seen from (9) and  = . The reduction in
the wage rate is, however, not persistent since the wage converges back to its initial
steady state value, despite further massive immigration. This behavior of the wage
rate is consistent with empirical evidence which, if anything, suggests a short-run drop
in the wage rate and negligible long-run eﬀects (e.g. Friedberg, 2001; Borjas, 2003;
Dustmann et al., 2005). The underlying reason for the increase in  along the smooth
transition is that firms, in both sectors, build up their capital stock because a larger
labor force makes installed capital goods more valuable. All other properties of the
transition paths are qualitatively similar to Fig. 2 (a).
is no oﬃcial house price index in Switzerland. However, the Zürcher Kantonalbank, a local bank
based in Zurich, publishes estimates based on own sales transactions data and data from an internet
platform for buying and renting houses and appartments (www.zkb.ch).
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Figure 6: The impact of labor market integration in period  = 0 under the same
presumptions as in Fig. 2 (a), except that the production technology for the tradable good
is modified to (28) with  = 05.
From Fig. 4 and 5 one also recognizes that rental prices started to increase (in 2004)
before net immigration started to increase (in 2006). This observation is in line with
our theory by noting that the Swiss labor market integration represents an expected
integration shock. We kept the analysis deliberately as simple as possible by assuming
an unexpected integration shock. Hence, the timing of events in the data (i.e., the
price increase first, then the increase in net immigration rates) can easily be reconciled
with our theory.
A sceptic may ask whether the observed magnitude of migration inflows can plau-
sibly be held responsible for the rental price increase. Two aspects are noteworthy
in this regard. An annual (net) migration inflow of 100 thousand people, like in the
year 2008 where Switzerland had 7.7 million inhabitants, amounted to a 1.4 percent
increase of the domestic population. Although this increase does not sound dramatic
at the first glance, these migration inflows were highly concentrated in urban areas.
For instance, the residential population in the canton of Zurich increased by about 9.1
percent between 2006 and 2011. The sales price index for residential property during
this period rose by about 30 percent (data source: http://www.zkb.ch).
The considerably rising prices for housing services have provoked an intensive debate
on the gains from migration in Switzerland. At the first glance, this seems remarkable
as wage eﬀects are barely visible and a large fraction of immigrants from EU countries
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is tertiary educated. The debate seems reasonable, however, in view of our model.
In particular, and consistent with the welfare eﬀects suggested by Proposition 6, the
association of tenants but not those of house owners have recently opposed further
immigration. This indicates that immigration to Switzerland has triggered a new
distributional conflict, which dominates recent policy and media debates. Previous
debates on migration have centered on wage eﬀects and the implications of low-skilled
migration on the social policy system. Recently, by contrast, not only populist right-
wing parties but also left-wing parties and interest groups argue in favor of slowing down
or even reversing migration flows. All important opponents to immigration started
focussing on rental rates of housing.15 The parties in the middle do not express strong
views. In the light of our model, this could be rationalized by the fact that their
constituency is particularly heterogenous in terms of their land- and houseownership.
7 Conclusion
This paper has examined the impact of labor market integration on migration, capital
formation, house prices, and land prices in an intertemporal model in which firms face
capital adjustment costs. Our theory is compatible with no or weak wage eﬀects. The
mechanism which acts as a drag on migration flows and prevents that everyone moves
to high-productivity regions, once this is legally made feasible, works through changes
in the price of housing. The predictions of our model are, for instance, in line with the
recent experience of Switzerland after integration of its labor market to the European
labor market.
We have examined how initial conditions (i.e., initial levels of population density,
productivity, and the capital stock) aﬀect the direction and evolution of migration and
capital flows over time. In particular, our theory provides a candidate explanation for
reverse migration. According to the best of our knowledge, previous studies based on
15According to our analysis, redistribution of land or wealth, or more indirect redistribution mea-
sures from rich landowners to poorer individuals, would be a way to spread the gains of landowners
from immigration to a wider population. This points to the possibility that, from a normative point
of view, redistribution measures may be preferable to reversing labor market integration.
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neoclassical models which rest on constant returns to scale did not explain that labor
market integration may lead to labor outflows in early phases of the transition to the
new long run equilibrium and immigration in later phases. In our model, the number
of people in the domestic economy is determined by the condition that life-time utility
in the source and the destination are equalized. As a result, technically, population
density is a jump variable which allows for non-monotonic transitions in a natural and
intuitive way.
At a normative level, the paper has shown how heterogeneity of landownership
determines the distributional consequences in response to labor market integration,
caused by changes in the rental rate of land. This may help to understand political
debates on and resistance to immigration even if immigration has negligible eﬀects on
the wage distribution.
As regards future research, we suggest to introduce externalities, implying that the
aggregate output technologies exhibit increasing returns to scale, such that multiple
equilibria may emerge. This modification could then be employed to examine how
initial conditions and expectations interact for the dynamic evolution of migration,
capital formation, house prices, and land prices.
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. The household’s problem is solved in two steps. In the first
step, the intertemporal consumption problem is solved. Omitting subscripts, define a
Cobb-Douglas consumption index,  := ¡¢ ¡¢1− such that instantaneous utility
is given by log. Consumption expenditure in a given period can be expressed as
 =  +   (29)
where  denotes an appropriately defined price index (see below). Life-time utility of
an individual born in  reads as  = log1 +  log2+1.
For later use, we also allow for second-period income. Denote income of an individ-
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ual born in  in the first and second period of life by 1 and 2+1, respectively. First-
period income is equal to the wage rate, 1 = . (Moreover, in the basic model, 2 ≡ 0.)
Let  denote individual savings in working age at time , i.e.,  := −11.
We have
1 =  − 1  (30)
2+1 = (1 + ) + 2+12+1  (31)
The intertemporal problem may be expressed as follows:
max
{log ( − )− log (1) +  log [(1 + ) + 2+1]−  log (2+1)}  (32)
Defining  ≡  + 2+11+ , the first-order condition implies
1 = 1
1 +  (33)
2+12+1
1 +  =

1 +  (34)
In the second step, we analyze the static problems. Given the amount of first period
consumption expenditure when young in , 1 = 11+, the household solves
max
11
log
h¡1¢ ¡1¢1−i s.t. 11 +  = 1 +  1 (35)
Hence,
1 = 1− 
 1 (36)
which combined with 1
1+ = 1 +  1 implies
1 = 1 +  

1 =
1− 
1 + 

  (37)
Similarly, given the amount of second period consumption expenditures when old in
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+ 1, 2+12+1 = (1+)1+ , the household solves
max
2+12+1
log
h¡2+1¢ ¡2+1¢1−i s.t.  (1 + )1 +   = 2+1 + +12+1 (38)
Hence, we get
2+1 = 1− 
+12+1 (39)
which combined with (1+)
1+  = 2+1 + +12+1 leads to
2+1 =  (1 + ) 1 +   

2+1 =
(1− ) (1 + ) 
1 + 

+1  (40)
Substituting (1 + )  = 1 and inserting the goods demand functions into the intertem-
poral utility function confirms (8)-(10). It remains to be shown that there exists a price
index as used above. Using  = ¡¢ ¡¢1−, the price index  may be expressed as
 = 
 + 
 =
µ 

¶1−
+ 
µ

¶
 (41)
Noting that  =

1− one gets
 = ¡¢1− "µ 
1− 
¶1−
+
µ
1− 

¶#
 (42)
This concludes the proof. ¥
Proof of Proposition 1. The Lagrangian function to the optimization problem
(3) of firms in sector  , implied by equilibrium condition 1 in Definition 1, is given by
L =
∞X
=0
µ
1
1 + 
¶µ
 
¡ ¢ () 1−− −  −   −  ∙1 + µ 
¶¸
+
 [ + (1− ) −+1])  (43)
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Using  = , the associated first-order conditions L = L = L = L+1 = 0 imply
 = 
¡ ¢1−
 () 1−−  (44)
 =  (1− − ) 
¡ ¢ () −− (45)
 =
µ  − 1
( + 1) 
¶ 1  (46)
(1− )+1 + +1
¡+1¢ (+1)−1 1−− + µ +1+1
¶+1
= (1 + ) (47)
Recall  =  and  =  . Then, first, (46) gives us (12). Substituting (46)
into (2) confirms (11). Substituting (1) as well as 1 and 2 as given by (9) into
equilibrium condition 6 in Definition 1,   = 1 + 2−1, and using  = 
implies
 ¡ ¢ () 1−− = 1− 1 +   ( + −1) (48)
Substituting (44) into (48) and solving for  we obtain
 = (1− )1 +  ( + −1) (49)
Advancing (49) by one period and using it in (47), as well as recalling  =  ,
 =  ,  =  , and  =  + −1 confirms (13). Moreover, substituting (49) into
(44) confirms (14). Substituting (44) into (45) and using (49) confirms (15).
We next show that, for a given population density (), the system (11)-(13) is
saddle-point stable. To see this, use (12) in (11) to find
∆+1 := +1 − =
"µ  − 1
( + 1) 
¶ 1
− 
#
  (50)
Thus, ∆+1 is increasing in . Moreover, the locus which is given by ∆+1 = 0 in
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 − −space is a horizontal line which is given by
 = 1 + (1 + ) ≡ ˜ (51)
Next, using (12) in (13) defines +1 implicitly as a function of  and . We see
that ∆+1 := +1−  is increasing in  . However, substituting +1 = ∆+1+  in
(13) and setting∆+1 = 0 could give us a positive or negative relationship between
and . Thus, it is possible that the locus which is given by∆+1 = 0 in −−space
is positively sloped or negatively sloped. Fortunately, in either case, the phase diagram
based on the derived properties of the dynamic system reveals saddle-point stability.
In either case, like in Fig. 1, the saddle-path is negatively sloped. This confirms part
(i).
To derive steady state expressions in part (ii), set +1 =  = ˜ as given by (51) in
(13) to confirm (16). Substituting  =  into (14) gives us (17). This concludes
the proof. ¥
Proof of Proposition 2. First, recall from the proof of Proposition 1 that the
saddle-path of the phase diagram in  − −space is downward-sloping. Moreover,
note that an increase in  or in  shifts the ∆−locus to the right and leaves the
∆−locus unaﬀected. This explains the eﬀects on  in part (i). The impact on
 follows from (15). The impact on  follows from (14) and (17). With respect to
part (ii), note by inspection of (11)-(13) that parameter  does not enter the dynamic
system. ¥
Proof of Proposition 3. Steady state utility of a foreign individual with wage
income only is given by  ∗ ≡  (∗ ∗ ∗). Using this and (10) in equilibrium
condition 3 in Definition 1 then confirms (18). Setting  = +1 = ˜(  ) and,
as the foreign economy is in steady state by assumption, ∗ = ˜(∗ ∗ ∗) in (18),
using (17) and solving for  confirms (19). This concludes the proof. ¥
Proof of Corollary 1. Directly follows from (19). ¥
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Proof of Proposition 4. Part (i) directly follows from (15)-(17), as discussed in
the main text. For part (ii), an example suﬃces. It is given in Fig. 3. To prove part
(iii), rewrite (18) as
log +1 + 1 log 
 =
1 + 

"
log
¡ 
∗
¢
1−  + log 
∗
#
≡ Ω (52)
Defining  := log  , we can write (52) as +1 = −1+Ω, which represents a linear,
inhomogenous, first-order diﬀerence equation. The solution is given by
 =
Ã
0 − Ω
1 + 1
!µ
−1
¶
+
Ω
1 + 1
. (53)
Diﬀerence equation +1 = −1 + Ω also implies that, in a steady state where
+1 =  as  → ∞, we must have lim→∞  = Ω1+ 1 . Since 0    1, this requires
0 = Ω1+ 1 . In this case the solution for 
 as given by (52) is constant over time. ¥
Proof of Proposition 5. First, note that (44)-(47) still hold. Thus, (11) and (12)
still hold.
We now have to reconsider equilibrium condition 6 in Definition 1 (clearing of the
non-tradable goods market). According to (9) and (21), demand for the non-tradable
good of a young and an old individual  in period , with landholding () in the second
period of life, is
1() = 1− 1 + 
+ +1()
  

2() = 1− 1 + 
+  ()
  (54)
respectively, where we used (7). Thus, total demand for the non-tradable good, denoted
by  , reads as
 = 1
1− 
1 + 
£
( + −1)+ (+1 +  )
¤  (55)
Substituting (44) into (55) and using (1), goods market clearing condition   = 
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implies

 =


1− 
1 + 
£ +  ¡+1 +  ¢¤  (56)
where we used the definition of . Combining (44) and (45) yields
 = (1− − )

  (57)
Combining (56) and (57) confirms (24). Advancing (56) by one period and using it in
(47) confirms (22). Inserting (56) into (44) leads to (23). This confirms part (i).
To derive steady state expressions in part (ii), recall the definitions of parameters
in part (ii) of Proposition 1. First, set +1 =  =  in (24) to confirm (25). Using
+1 =  = ˜ as given by (51) in (22) and substituting the steady state value for the
price of land as given in (25) for +2 confirms (26). Substituting the steady state
values for  from (25) and for  from (26) into (23) gives us (27). This concludes
the proof. ¥
Proof of Lemma 2. Individual  born in  does not want to migrate from the
domestic to the foreign economy if  (()   +1)   (() ˆ∗ ˆ∗). According
to (10) and (21), this is equivalent to
(1 + ) log
Ã + 2+1()
1+
∗ + 2+1()
1+
!
 (1− )
∙
log
µ 
∗
¶
+  log
µ+1
∗
¶¸
 (58)
where 2+1() = +1() denotes the land income received in the second period of life
of an individual  born in . Note that for 2  0, we have +
2
1+
∗+ 2
1+
 () ∗ if   ()∗.
Thus, if   ∗ and (18) holds, a landowning individual does not want to migrate
from the domestic to the foreign economy, as (58) is fulfilled. Similarly, if   ∗ and
(18) holds, a landowning individual does not want to migrate from the foreign to the
domestic economy. This concludes the proof. ¥
Proof of Proposition 6. Recall that  =  and that the dynamic system in
Proposition 5 is independent of the distribution of land among individuals. The result
37
then follows from using (21), (25) and (27) in (10). ¥
References
[1] Abel, Andrew B. (1982). Dynamic Eﬀects of Permanent and Temporary Tax Poli-
cies in a q model of Investment, Journal of Monetary Economics 9, 353—373.
[2] Beine, Michel, Frédéric Docquier and Caglar Ozden (2011). Diasporas, Journal of
Development Economics 95, 30-41.
[3] Borjas, George (2003). The Labor Demand Curve Is Downward Sloping: Reex-
amining the Impact of Immigration on the Labor Market, Quarterly Journal of
Economics 118, 1335—1374.
[4] Braun, Juan (1993). Essays on Economic Growth and Migration, Cambridge MA,
Harvard University, Ph.D. Dissertation.
[5] Burda, Michael C. (2006). Factor Reallocation in Eastern Germany after Reunifi-
cation, American Economic Review 96, 368-374.
[6] Dustmann, Christian, Francesca Fabbri, and Ian Preston (2005). The Impact of
Immigration on the British Labour Market, Economic Journal 115, F324—F341.
[7] Faini, Riccardo (1996). Increasing Returns, Migration and Convergence, Journal
of Development Economics 49, 121-136.
[8] Felbermayr, Gabriel, Volker Grossmann and Wilhelm Kohler (2012). Migration,
International Trade and Capital Formation: Cause or Eﬀect?, IZA Discussion Pa-
per No. 6975 (first draft of a forthcoming chapter in: Barry R. Chiswick and Paul
W. Miller, The Handbook on the Economics of International Migration, Elsevier).
[9] Grogger, Jeﬀrey and Gordon H. Hanson (2011). Income Maximization and the Se-
lection and Sorting of International Migrants, Journal of Development Economics
95, 42-57.
38
[10] Grossmann, Volker and David Stadelmann (2011). Does International Mobility of
High-Skilled Workers Aggravate Between-Country Inequality?, Journal of Devel-
opment Economics 95, 88-94.
[11] Grossmann, Volker and David Stadelmann (2012). Wage Eﬀects of High-skilled
Migration: International Evidence, World Bank Economic Review, forthcoming.
[12] Hayashi, Fumio (1982). Tobin’s marginal q and average q: a neoclassical interpre-
tation, Econometrica 50, 213—224.
[13] Johnson, David S., John M. Rogers and Lucilla Tan (2001). A Century of Family
Budgets in the United States, Monthly Labor Review 124 (5), 28-45.
[14] Nygaard, Christian (2011). International Migration, Housing Demand and Access
to Homeownership in the UK, Urban Studies 48, 2211-2229.
[15] O’Rourke, Kevin H. and Jeﬀrey G. Williamson (1999). Globalization and History:
The Evolution of a Nineteenth Century Atlantic economy, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT
Press.
[16] Ottaviano, Gianmarco I.P. and Giovanni Peri (2012). Rethinking the Eﬀect of
Immigration on Wages, Journal of the European Economic Association 10, 152—
197.
[17] Rappaport, Jordan (2005). How does labor mobility aﬀect income convergence?,
Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 29, 567-581,
[18] Reichlin, Pietro and Aldo Rustichini (1998). Diverging Patterns with Endogenous
Labor Migration, Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 22, 703-728.
[19] Saiz, Albert (2003). Room in the Kitchen for the Melting Pot: Immigration and
Rental Prices, Review of Economics and Statistics 85, 502—521.
[20] Saiz, Albert (2007). Immigration and Housing Rents in American Cities, Journal
of Urban Economics 61, 345-371.
39
[21] Schäfer, Andreas and Thomas M. Steger (2012). Journey into the Unknown? Eco-
nomic Consequences of Factor Market Integration under Increasing Returns to
Scale, CESifo Working Paper No. 3676.
[22] Solimano, Andrés and Nathalie Watts (2005). International Migration, Capital
Flows and the Global Economy: A Long Run View, United Nations Economic
Development Division, Santiago, Chile.
[23] Statistisches Bundesamt (1993-2011): Fachserie 1, Reihe 1.2: Bevölkerung und
Erwerbstätigkeit, Wiesbaden.
[24] United Nations (2010). World Population Prospects 2010: Migration.
40
Authors
Volker GROSSMANN 
University of Fribourg; CESifo, Munich; Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) Bonn. University of Fribourg, 
Bd. de Pérolles 90, CH-1700 Fribourg, +41 (0) 26 300-9383 volker.grossmann@unifr.ch 
Andreas SCHÄFER
University of Leipzig. Institute for Theoretical Economics, Grimmaische Strasse 12,
04109 Leipzig, Germany. schaefer@wifa.uni-leipzig.de
Thomas M. STEGER
University of Leipzig; CESifo, Munich. Institute for Theoretical Economics, Grimmaische
Strasse 12, 04109 Leipzig, Germany.  steger@wifa.uni-leipzig.de
Abstract 
We investigate the effects of interregional labor market integration in a two-sector, 
overlapping-generations model with land-intensive production in the non-tradable goods sector (housing). 
To capture the response to migration on housing supply, capital formation is endogenous, assuming that 
firms face capital adjustment costs. Our analysis highlights heterogeneous welfare effects of labor market 
integration. Whereas individuals without residential property lose from immigration due to increased 
housing costs, landowners may win. Moreover, we show how the relationship between migration and 
capital formation depends on initial conditions at the time of labor market integration. Our model is also 
capable to explain the reversal of migration during the transition to the steady state, like observed in East 
Germany after unification in 1990. It is also consistent with a gradually rising migration stock and house 
prices in high-productivity countries like Switzerland.
Keywords
Capital formation; House prices; Land distribution; Migration; Welfare
 
JEL Classification 
D90, F20, O10
Citation proposal 
Grossmann Volker, Schäfer Andreas, Steger Thomas M. 2013. «Migration, Capital Formation, and 
House Prices». Working Papers SES 441, Faculty of Economics and Social Sciences, University of 
Fribourg (Switzerland)
 
Working Papers SES
Last published : 
433 Wallmeier M., Tauscher K.: A Note on the Impact of Portfolio Overlapping in Tests of the Fama and 
French Three-Factor Model; 2012
434 Gmür M., Gmür M.: Bezahlte Freiwilligenarbeit - ein Widerspruch?; 2012
435 Gmür M., Wolf M., Schafer J.: Professionelles Management und Zielerreichung im Verein; 2012
436 Felbermayr G., Grossmann V., Kohler W.: Migration, International Trade and Capital Formation: 
Cause or Effect?; 2012
437 Schafer J.: Erfolgsfaktoren der Nachwuchsförderung in Sportverbänden; 2012
438 Zeides R., Gmür M.: Management Excellence in Pflegeeinrichtungen; 2012
439 Bosch P.: Value Relevance of the Fair Value Hierarchy of IFRS 7 in Europe. How reliable are 
mark-to-model Fair Values?; 2012
440 Gmür M.: Finanzierungsmix und Effizienz in spendensammelnden Organisationen; 2013
Catalogue and download links:
http://www.unifr.ch/ses/wp
http://doc.rero.ch/collection/UNIFR_WORKING_PAPERS_SES 
